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This article is dedicated to the develo-
pment of European unity in Central Europe 
and Scandinavia as a mechanism of collective 
security and intergovernmental cooperation 
development. The cultural and historical fea-
tures of Central Europe and Scandinavia em-
phasize the need for a comparative study into 
the European idea. This article considers the 
tendencies and factors which affected the de-
velopment of the European idea in the frame-
work of the post-war planning. 
This research sets out to compare and iden-
tify similar or analogous features and elements 
of the theoretical bases of movements for Euro-
pean unity in Central and Northern Europe. 
The author comes to the conclusion about 
the correlation between the “Europe of re-
gions” model and the European unity con-
cept. The ideas of Scandinavian and Central 
European integration rested on national, cul-
tural and historical connections of the neigh-
bouring countries were expected to constitute 
such formations, which contradicted and 
were opposed to by the theoretical framework 
of Western European integration. On the oth-
er hand, regional integration implied that a 
federation or union of the neighbouring states 
could be considered a step towards a more 
universal organisation, which would not 
mean the isolation of Scandinavia and Cen-
tral Europe from the rest of the world. 
The theoretical and practical significance 
of this work lies in the comparative approach 
to the analysis of the phenomena which have 
been considered individually in the frame-
work of historiography. It is the major contri-
bution of the article to the research on history 
of ideas and European diplomacy. Moreover, 
the subject of research is immediately con-
nected to the problem of security in the Baltic 
region and the Soviet factor, as well as politi-
cal stereotypes produced in this field. 
The author employed historical compa-
rative and inductive types of the historical ty-
pological method. 
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When conducting a comparative analysis of the role and place of the 
European idea in Central Europe and Scandinavia over the given period, one 
cannot but pay attention to the fundamental differences between these geo-
graphical regions from the perspective of political and cultural-historical 
homogeneity. Central Europe, which in this case is understood in the frame-
work of the projects of Central European integration and thus includes such 
Eastern countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, demonstrates a 
much lower level of political homogeneity, which suggests stable intergo-
vernmental connections, a similar degree of the development and a quality of 
civil society institutions, as well as the form of political system and tradition, 
than Scandinavian countries. On the other hand, if one gets abstracted from 
an enormous influence on the development of the European idea exerted by 
the standing of these countries in the system of relations between the USSR 
and Western allies, one can identify a number of commonalities, which dis-
tinguish them from and bring them together with the countries of Western 
Europe at the same time. This qualitative trend is most pronounced in the 
discussion and projects dedicated to the post-war European unity. 
Throughout the interbellum (1918—1939), Central Europe played an 
important role in the French foreign policy, but in 1939, due to obvious rea-
sons, the “mentor” function was handed over to Great Britain. In this con-
nection, it is important to identify the two major areas that provided grounds 
for a heated socio-political discussion: between the USA and Great Britain 
(if one does not take into account the obvious differences in views on the 
post-war settlement of Europe with the Soviet leadership) and among Euro-
pean states, namely, in the circle of governments in exile and Resistance 
movements, which supported the idea of European unity in this or that form. 
A number of approaches and ideas that emerged in that period became the 
foundations of the European Union and European integration in general. 
The Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile, Władysław Sikor-
ski, was, probably, the most consistent advocate of the federation concept. 
Theoretically, his idea implied a significant Polish influence within a Central 
European Federation, which would make Warsaw an equal partner in the re-
lations with London and Paris, thus, German aggression against the USSR 
was perceived as a factor contributing to the implementation of this plan. 
In effect, W. Sikorski’s position fits perfectly within the framework of 
the New Europe concept presented by Winston Churchill to the Soviet am-
bassador, I. Maisky, in London in a conversation that took place on Decem-
ber 5, 1941. W. Churchill assumed that the new confederation could bring 
together Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece. And the group of 
participants could be later extended comprising a zone of states with com-
mon defence, foreign and economic policy. Such a federation could have 
united approximately 130 mln people and led to the integration of the whole 
Europe [19]. 
Sikorski put significant efforts in the establishment — alongside the Pol-
ish-Czechoslovakian confederation, the idea of which dominated his foreign 
policy activity — of a bloc of eight European states, whose governments in 
exile were based in London, namely, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia, the 
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Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and Yugoslavia. Almost simulta-
neously, in June 1942, the Belgian, Norwegian, and Danish governments in 
London presented a joint project of an international security system resting 
on the regional pacts in North Atlantic, South Atlantic and the Pacific re-
gion, which later could become a foundation of the world organisation. The 
parties that would sign the pact would be guaranteed collective security 
measures against aggression in the regions mentioned. 
The Polish government pinned their hopes on the transatlantic ally — the 
USA. But the States, as well as Great Britain, expressed growing concerns 
regarding the Soviet factor. In the messages of February 29, 1942 to the US 
Secretary of State, C. Hull and his deputy S. Wells, the US ambassador to 
the UK, the US diplomat A. J. D. Biddle emphasized the need to monitor the 
steps taken by the Polish government, which, in the American public opi-
nion, inflicted damage to Russia [17, p. 58]. As a result, on March 6, the 
White House authorised A. J. D. Biddle to inform W. Sikorski that they were 
not interested in further discussions of his proposal regarding a post-war 
commonwealth and the concept of uniting Central and Eastern European 
states [17, p. 59]. 
Next day President F. Roosevelt reiterated his disagreement with W. Si-
korski’s declaration on the post-war cooperation of small states. Roosevelt 
emphasised in his directive for the Department of State that there is a need to 
interfere in Sikorski’s plan. He believed that it was not a good time to touch 
the issue of the post-war position of small states, since it would result in se-
rious problems with Russia [9, р. 113]. 
On March 16, 1943, the UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, An-
thony Eden and the British ambassador to the USA, the Viscount of Halifax, 
met the deputy Secretary of State, S. Wells. The British government was in-
clined to support the idea of two federations in Europe: the Balkan and Cen-
tral European one. S. Wells shared the British point of view, foreseeing the 
possibility of the establishment, alongside the Balkan federation, of a fede-
ration bringing together Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland [17]. At the 
same time, it was clear that W. Churchill is changing his opinion on the fe-
deral system of the post-war Europe, trying to distance himself from the idea 
of a Central European federation. 
Probably, this circumstance could explain why, on March 21, 1943, 
W. Churchill returned to the idea of the Council of Europe. It is worth noting 
(despite leaping ahead) that the history of the foundation of the Council of 
Europe, which took place in 1949, is apparently connected with the idea of 
the British Prime Minister. The Council was supposed to incorporate “a 
High Court to adjust disputes”. In his opinion, the small states united by the 
confederation would become equal partners of great States. Churchill propo-
sed the creation of three unions: the Scandinavian, Danube, and Balkan [15]. 
Apparently, he avoided the definition of “Central European” union with Pol-
ish participation on purpose — in order not to irritate the Soviet government. 
In early 1943, it became evident that any discussions relating to the 
changes in the post-war European organisation are impossible without the 
participation of great powers and the problem of keeping peace cannot be 
solved exclusively at the European level. 
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In May 1943, W. Churchill announced in the course of negotiations with 
F. Roosevelt that, after the war, Europe will consist of twelve states or con-
federations, which will form the European regional council, where the US 
participation would be extremely appreciated. Moreover, he expressed his 
hope that several unions would be established in Southeast Europe — the 
Danube Federation with a capital in Vienna, which would fill the vacuum 
that had been created by the dissolution of Austro-Hungarian Empire, and 
the Balkan federation. As to Poland and Czechoslovakia, they are supposed 
to cultivate friendly relations with the USSR [2]. 
To a degree, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak 
was right to say that Stalin had deserved the right to be called the father of 
the European unity [10]. His extreme position on the European integration 
and all its possible forms made European countries gravitate to each other. 
The last illusions as to the Soviet position on the federation issue were 
dispelled at the Moscow Meeting of the Allied Foreign Ministers on October 
19—30, 1943, when the UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony 
Eden — in conformity with instructions — tried to put the issue of a Central 
European Federation on the agenda. He put forward a proposal that the rep-
resentatives of three powers adopt a declaration on joint responsibility for 
the post-war Europe based on four principles: universal freedom of govern-
ment elections, right of states to accede to international associations or con-
federations, support of great powers for states interested in acceding to such 
confederations, opposition to the formation of “spheres of influence” [1,  
p. 161—162]. V. Molotov accused him of an attempt of resuming the “sani-
tary cordon” policy between the USSR and the rest of Europe [1, p. 180]. 
Since C. Hull did not support A. Eden, he found himself isolated and had no 
other choice than to withdraw the issue form the agenda. 
As a result, the Soviet delegation handed over to their American and 
British counterparts a statement on the future of Poland, Danubian and Bal-
kan countries, including the issue of confederation. It was meant to summa-
rise the Soviet position, namely, that the establishment of a federation 
through the decisions of governments in exile, which by definition cannot be 
closely connected to their nations, can be interpreted as imposing decisions 
that do not reflect the desires of the nations. Moreover, the statement empha-
sized that certain federation projects reminded the Soviet people of the sani-
tary cordon policy aimed against the Soviet Union and thus perceived nega-
tively in the country [1, p. 329]. 
Among the few who adhered to a more reserved position were the Soviet 
ambassador to the UK, I. Maisky and the deputy People’s Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov. In January 1944, they stressed that it is not in 
the Soviet interests to facilitate the establishment of various federations — 
whether Balkan, Danubian, Central European or Scandinavian — at least 
immediately after the war. The consensus was believed to lie in the USSR 
remaining an impregnable power in Europe [20, p. 85]. 
As to Scandinavia, it is worth noting that the problem of collective secu-
rity system, the Soviet factor, and the concerns of small states that cannot 
 International relations: historical aspects 
 104
oppose on their own the threats posed by large aggressors played an equally 
important role in the framework of a Central European federation. 
It is worth focusing on the Swedish approach, since it was the Swedish 
political and public circles that played the leading role in the Scandinavian 
initiatives towards integration at the intergovernmental level in the interbel-
lum. At the same time, the history of the Swedish idea of establishment of 
intergovernmental associations of European and even world level was almost 
always limited geographically to Scandinavian countries and was signifi-
cantly influenced by the ideas borrowed from the continental Europe, first of 
all, France. The Swedish approach is characterised by an increased interest 
in the neutrality of Scandinavian countries and international and intergo-
vernmental arbitration. 
The policy of Scandinavian neutrality was relatively successful in the 
years of both World Wars and it became a serious argument for the suppor-
ters of Sweden's remaining a neutral state and avoiding limitations and obli-
gations imposed by international alliances and unions. On the other hand, 
one cannot ignore the fact that the neighbouring countries, which also pur-
sued the neutrality policy — Denmark and Norway, were involved in the 
war this or that way. It became obvious — the countries of the world are in-
terconnected to such a degree that they are interdependent and neutrality 
could not be the only possible model for Sweden anymore. 
It is worth noting that the idea of a European federation was discussed in 
Swedish public circles during the interbellum. In this context one cannot but 
recall R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa, published in Sweden in 
1930 several months after the famous initiative of the French Foreign Mi-
nister, Aristide Briand, on the establishment of a European Federation in the 
framework of the League of Nations [6]. After the war had begun, a book by 
the former Czechoslovakian President, Edvard Beneš, entitled Democracy 
Today and Tomorrow was published in the Swedish language. The author 
expressed a hope that the European crisis would lead to the development of 
more democratic structures in the framework of the European state, as well 
as a better intra-European organisation. And such a reorganisation was ex-
pected to start with the foundation of regional federations, including a Scan-
dinavian one [5]. 
Sweden acceded to the League of Nations after World War I and began 
to pursue a policy of qualitative development of cooperation between the 
Nordic countries. The events of World War II forced its foreign policy to be-
come more flexible and adapt to the dynamically changing power ratio rather 
than to be a policy of the firmly established principles. While the Polish and 
Czech counterparts were actively exploiting the theme of the post-war inte-
gration, in Swedish governmental circles, first serious considerations about 
the post-war policy emerged only at the end of the war, when the correlation 
of opposing powers became more evident. 
But an increased cautiousness and pragmatism of the official circles did 
not hamper public debate on the post-war international organisation, which 
followed the federalist model. However, there is little evidence of the direct 
support of a European Federation. The idea was actively discussed by Swed-
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ish authors, but it was not the only one and, moreover, was not considered as 
a preferable solution to the problem of the post-war security. A Nordic or, as 
strange as it sounds, a World Federation was perceived as a more viable sce-
nario. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe was actively discussed [6]. But, 
except for H. Stolpe, there was no other author, whose works were dedicated 
immediately and exclusive to this issue [18]. A consistent moderate attitude 
to the “European idea” is characteristic of Scandinavia in general, but as to 
Sweden, there was also the factor of a “medium” state, which was mani-
fested in certain cultural and historical features. If there had been a need to 
protect its social and political traditions, Sweden would have preferred a un-
ion with only its Scandinavian neighbors, which, unlike it, would have been 
more orientated towards continental Europe (Denmark) or transatlantic rela-
tions (Norway). Anyway, the Pan-European movement “constituted a public 
space where both the meaning of Europe and the vision of united Europe 
were discussed. This public space, however, was not homogeneous, but ra-
ther, multi-layered and controversial” [3, р. 25]. 
Karl Ekblom, one of the leaders of Swedish Peace and Arbitration So-
ciety, was one of the first Swedes to discuss the opportunities for the estab-
lishment of an international federation after the end of the war. However, he 
emphasized that, when putting forward new ideas of a world or European or-
ganisation, one should keep in mind that the old structures have not been 
demolished, nor have they lost their relevance [8, р. 4]. 
Another advocate of an international federation, Halvar Khennet, sup-
ported the idea of a Nordic federation as a part of a global one. He stressed 
that it is desirable that the member states would not differ dramatically in 
size or economic and cultural features. Thus, it would be preferable that 
small states united in subfederations, which would form unions in the 
framework of larger alliances [12, p. 43—44]. Of course, Scandinavia was 
considered promising grounds for such a federation. Thus, Khennet wrote 
that the United States of the North — Nordern — should become a member 
of the future world organisation and an integral element in the broad context 
of keeping peace. He concluded that only a true supranational union can 
provide such a level of security for a group of small states, which they can-
not ensure independently [12, p. 45]. 
One of the most eminent Swedish advocates of an international federa-
tion is the philosopher and enlightener, Alf Ahlberg. In his works, he men-
tions a European Federation as an element of the new world order [4]. 
The famous Swedish author, Alva Myrdal, paid significant attention to 
the problems of the post-war planning. A large number of her works is dedi-
cated to the economic recovery and social transformations after the war. She 
wrote that the balance of power between small and large states is a problem 
that lacks clear formulation in any official project. In this connection, she re-
ferred to W. Churchill’s statement made in April 1943, which focused on the 
establishment of a “Council of Europe”, the members of which could be fe-
derations of small states. Sweden was expected to analyse whether this 
framework was too limiting for it, since Scandinavia, not unlike Great Bri-
tain, was not used to considering itself just a part of Europe. A. Myrdal em-
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phasized that the closest cooperation should bring Sweden together with the 
Nordic neighbours and doubted that it would serve Swedish or Scandinavian 
interests to accede to a purely European organisation. She supposed that a 
Nordic Union could be a better alternative [14, р. 137—138]. 
Lt.-Col. Torsten Holm paid significant attention to the issue of interna-
tional security and military history in his works. He thought it was obvious 
that the Nordic isolation policy is incompatible with the idea of an interna-
tional peace organisation [11, р. 76]. It is worth recalling that the idea of a 
defence union between Finland, Norway, and Sweden was put forward in 
March 1942. After Denmark and Norway had been occupied, the debate on a 
future Nordic defence union was resumed. It also focused on common fo-
reign policy. A manifestation of this approach is the document entitled Nor-
dens forenta stater, which was published in spring 1942. The ideas presented 
in it implied, inter alia, a total coordination of the security mechanisms in 
Northern Europe. The authors were quite optimistic to suppose that such 
measures as the consolidation of air forces will make it possible to repel any 
military attacks. They also maintained that the Nordic countries would be 
able to preserve their traditions of law and equity, if they cooperated in the 
sphere of politics, which required the establishment of a Nordic Union with a 
common government, foreign policy, defence system, supreme court, and 
parliament [16]. 
In the Swedish public circles, the dominant trend, which gained most 
support, was ensuring the post-war security in the framework of the Nor-
thern or exclusively Swedish dimension. There was a considerable scepti-
cism towards the possible world organisation, thus, it was a general senti-
ment that Northern Europe should develop a strong security system. On the 
other hand, the Swedish peace movement emphasised that a Northern asso-
ciation should be considered a step towards a more universal organisation, 
which would help avoid the isolation of Scandinavia from the rest of the 
world. 
Czechoslovakian and Polish politicians often voiced ideas about the need 
to establish a Northern alliance. In his report delivered in Chicago on May 
22, 1943, Edvard Beneš forecast that many small nations would create a 
large alliance in the future Europe [7]. In an interview given on July 2, 1943 
in Cairo, the Polish Prime Minister, W. Sikorski, maintained that peace 
should rather be protected by a pan-European federation featuring Poland 
and Czechoslovakia as the central bloc and with the participation of the Nor-
dic Union. 
It becomes clear that the diplomatic opposition between the Western al-
lies and the USSR in regard to the problem of the post-war planning in Eu-
rope, and the ensuing Cold War could be called the “midwives” in the birth 
of the contemporary European community. The projects of a Central Euro-
pean and Scandinavian integration as variants that did not properly fit the 
model of the “common Europe” in its classical Western European under-
standing were no exception in this context, whereas for the “eastern bloc”, 
the aspiration to join the European community was a driving ambition 
throughout the second half the 20th century. 
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The Soviet leadership of the Stalin era considered the European integra-
tion, first of all, as a potential threat to the security interests of the USSR; 
this attitude was based on numerous examples from the 19th and 20th centu-
ries. However, Moscow did not pay due attention to the economic aspect and 
thus interpreted this European process as a strategic step towards the future 
conflict with the Soviet Union. 
As to another key aspect, it is worth noting that the inclination of the ad-
vocates of Central European and Scandinavian integration towards the model 
of Europe of regions is rather ambiguous. The European community cannot 
be built on the basis of an abstract schematic federalisation of artificial re-
gions or through disassembling the national level structures [13]. However, 
this circumstance was often ignored by the advocates of Eastern European 
and Scandinavian integration. 
As to Scandinavia, one can mention that over the post-war period, the re-
lations between the Nordic countries increasingly became a matter of poli-
tical prestige rather than those of pure security. In the first post-war years, 
Scandinavian countries hoped that the gap between the West and the East 
could be gradually overcome. The economic manifestation of these attitudes 
was, in particular, the Swedish-Soviet credit agreement of 1945—1946, 
which had both economic and political motives, whereas the importance of 
forging friendly relations with the USSR was unambiguously emphasised. 
The Swedish aspiration for Nordic cooperation in the post-war period 
was partially determined by the need to use it to ensure collective security 
and create a wider platform for the neutrality policy than the one available at 
the national level. It is due to this reason and non-involvement in the war and 
stable economic conditions at the initial stage of the Cold War that Sweden 
took on the initiative to organise cooperation in the field of security between 
Scandinavian countries, which would bring about a thaw in relations with 
the USSR. The bipolar structure of the post-war world attached major signi-
ficance on the political agenda to the projects with Nordic participation. 
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